

# THE NEW REPUBLIC

## Breaking Up CIA

*The President's prompt decision following his election to reappoint Allen W. Dulles as chief of the Central Intelligence Agency was no great surprise. Dulles, like J. Edgar Hoover, had come to be one of those pillars of the Republic that no President and no Congress could remove easily. Mr. Kennedy spoke privately then of putting in as Deputy to Mr. Dulles a man of his own who would, within not too many months after the transition from one Administration to another, move up as Director. For his part, Mr. Dulles expressed the belief that his continued presence would symbolize the non-partisan character of intelligence. But with the collapse after Cuba of public confidence in the competence of CIA, the untouchability of the Agency came to an end. The House Rules Committee is toying with the idea of a full-scale investigation. Sen. Eugene McCarthy has introduced a resolution reviving earlier proposals for some kind of Congressional watchdog (the CIA is the only agency whose books are not open either to the General Accounting Office or to regular Congressional scrutiny). An eight-member Presidential advisory group headed by Dr. James Killian is said to be studying a fundamental reorganization of US intelligence which might conceivably, among other things, break up the CIA altogether. Some consideration has even been given to what might be done in the event of drastic reorganization with the CIA's mammoth and highly visible new headquarters on the Virginia side of the Potomac. Before the summer is out Allen Dulles will probably be out too, though he may be permitted to fade away on a leave of absence. The CIA role in the Cuban disaster is not, however, solely responsible for the contemplated reforms. The White House has been careful not to single out CIA as the scapegoat. There have been stories inspired by members of the Presi-*

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T.R.B.  
from  
Washington

### Some Choose Fear

★ "We must choose between freedom and fear - we cannot have both," wrote Zechariah Chafee in 1956. He went on to say that if citizens choose fear the real rulers of the country will be fanatics "fired with a zeal to save grown men from objectionable ideas by putting them under the care of official nursemaids."

The advocates of fear were aided, we think, by two 5-4 decisions by the Supreme Court last week virtually outlawing the Communist Party. Theoretically the Party can still teach overthrow of the government but not teaching that can be interpreted as "incitement." Probably the high court can understand the distinction but we doubt if lower courts and the FBI can. The decisions, we think, open the door a little wider for the witch-hunters just when world tension is a little greater.

Kennedy on crutches is back in Washington. Before flying to Florida he told the nation about his talks with Khrushchev. Kennedy spoke somberly. Only the insensitive failed to understand that he was trying to convey the grim mood of Vienna. It was not comforting for timid spirits. Many would prefer the lulling tones of Eisenhower. Things were getting worse then, but people felt better. Kennedy might have raged against "godless Communism" — that would have channeled anxiety into the relief of hatred. Or he could have uttered hopeful platitudes: that would have pleased the sleeping pill addicts. Instead he spoke quietly and candidly and did not pretend there are immediate solutions.

How does this leave the choice between freedom and fear? Every time

strain increases it helps to revive sub-surface hysteria. The John Birch Society is not important in itself but again reveals the compulsion in some to choose fear. (Little Finland knows danger, it lives within the curl of the Bear's paw. Yet it has chosen freedom; it has not outlawed, for example, the Communist Party.)

The Court majority has further attenuated the old Brandeis-Holmes distinction between physical *acts* to overthrow the government (illegal) and *teaching* the moral rightness of ultimate overthrow (legal). Thomas Jefferson taught the latter. The Court majority thinks the distinction is still there. Douglas and Black doubt it.

The new rulings incidentally revive the all but moribund Subversive Activities Control Board. That 5-man agency established under the 1950 McCarran Act (over Truman's veto) decides whether trade unions are Communist-infiltrated and whether organizations are officially "Communist fronts." Its members draw \$20,000-a-year salaries. We had all but forgotten them in their quiet hide-away. Twice before courts slapped down their efforts to proscribe the Communist Party; this time they have succeeded. We shall be hearing more of them from now on.

## Burden of the Cities

★ The first world conference of mayors opens here this week; it finds American cities in a sorry plight. The normal US city is the step-child of the state legislature and is turning in increasing desperation to Washington. Efficiency of city governments, while not perfect, is enormously improved since 1900. But US cities have an increasing burden as people move into them (70 percent of all citizens now live in urban areas). School costs soar but city revenue sources (mostly property and sales taxes) prove less and less adequate.

It will astonish most people to compare the rate at which state-local debt is increasing with federal debt. The official comparison is compiled by the Commerce Department. Federal debt for this purpose omits IOU's which the government holds itself (as in social security). Federal debt rose to a 1945 postwar peak of \$252.7 billions. By mid-1960 it was \$241 billion (less than

the war peak). By contrast, state-local debt was \$13.7 billion when the war ended when most cities had postponed urgent improvements. By mid-June, 1960, it had jumped to \$60 billion.

The fact is, our cities are in a bad way. The voter generally knows only about his own city and does not see the general situation. Increasing grants from Washington keep many cities solvent.

A curious feature is the role of inflation in all this. Last week the budget director of NYC wrote a letter to the *NYTimes* boasting that Mayor Wagner was borrowing on a buy-now-pay-later basis. The *Times* took a dim view of this and commented editorially, "When you don't pay cash the cost of government is higher no matter how you juggle the upside-down arguments."

Neither side specifically mentioned inflation. But it is important in any long-term debt. If the city borrowed in 1910 and paid back now it hired expensive dollars and paid back cheap dollars. Prices have averaged an increase of  $2\frac{1}{3}$  percent a year over the past 60 years. (In most countries it has been higher.) This may be no excuse for the NYC policy but it deserves to be considered. Of course it works both ways. The man whose \$20,000 annuity comes due finds it won't buy what he had expected when he made the contract 25 years earlier. Here it is the insurance company that received expensive dollars and pays back cheap ones.

## Reality Crashed In

★ Gerald Johnson's review of the new book on Borah by Marian McKenna last week brought back old memories. On the night of Pearl Harbor we stood with a little group of subdued reporters on the portico of the White House in the shade of the columns, shivering with history. FDR had called in the Foreign Relations Committee and we interviewed them briefly one by one as they arrived. All but Borah.

His leonine face was set and grim. He had called it a "phony war" – and he had better information than the State Department. And now reality had crashed in. We all admired him; there was strength and greatness about him. But he had been ruined in an afternoon. As for the rest of him in. Not one of us said a word.

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## Breaking Up CIA

dent's staff suggesting that the Pentagon is as much if not more to blame. In our view it is of special importance to recognize that the case for the abolition of CIA and for a general reorganization of US intelligence rests on something more substantial than one isolated instance of spectacular misjudgment and mismanagement in Cuba. What emerges from post-mortems on the events of April 19 is not that CIA so openly bungled. It is that CIA had in effect been entrusted with broad responsibility for US policy which properly belonged in the State Department. This had been true under Eisenhower, but the President-elect did not disturb the arrangement. The fact that Mr. Kennedy was unable to find a satisfactory Assistant Secretary of State for Latin American Affairs, and that Mr. Adolf Berle had been operating out of the White House as a kind of interim Assistant Secretary – a set-up that will end now that Dean Carl B. Spaeth of the Stanford Law School has accepted the post – meant that CIA was not subject even to the nominal operating check of the responsible regional authority in the State Department. Still, it would probably have made little difference had Mr. Spaeth been selected in February rather than last week, for the power of the CIA to venture forth on its own without reference to any larger purposes of our foreign policy had come to seem natural and proper. The CIA's preponderance in resources (an estimated annual budget of not less than \$500 million and quite possibly \$1 billion, as compared with a requested total budget of \$247,013,610 for State in 1961) was reinforced by the disposition of Foster Dulles to rely more on the judgments cast up by his brother's labyrinthine apparatus than on his own State Department expertise.

This phenomenon was noted previously by *The New Republic* and will be the subject of further comment next week, because it is here that the Cuban experience has been most revealing. It is one thing to say that the CIA proved incompetent but quite another to suggest that Cuba uncovered a state of dangerous disarray in our whole process of foreign policy planning. If it were thought that the President need only tighten up CIA operations, then a few firings and some tinkering with the structure – such as transferring operational responsibility for para-military activities to another jurisdiction – would suffice. But if the President's problem is how intelligence should fit into a new scheme of policy formulation, then the need for more fundamental reorganization becomes plainer.

It is not yet clear how the Kennedy Administration sees the problem. Some in CIA have talked privately to newsmen about plans of the Agency to move into its new quarters in September – as if to say that nothing much will change. And nothing of consequence has by

all accounts changed since Cuba inside the CIA. (One learns of an anti-Castro Cuban who got a phone call two weeks ago from the CIA. He was given a message by a secretary from "Mr. Bender" - the agent who had been in charge of the landing and a man widely known to be anathema to the Cuban in question - only to get another call an hour later informing him that the message had really come from Mr. So and So, and that "Mr. Bender" no longer had anything to do with Cuban matters! Where, one wonders, is "Mr. Bender" now?)

We can appreciate that the President and his advisers may wish to proceed cautiously, lest the baby be lost with the bathwater. They may be in no hurry to dismantle the intelligence operation we have until it is clear what should take its place, after which new appointments can sensibly be made. One encouraging sign is that the much-publicized report submitted last week by Gen. Maxwell D. Taylor on the narrow issue of relocating para-military operations outside of CIA is not to be the last word. More sweeping recommendations are to come from the Killian Committee, which has been meeting quietly with an eye to a July 1 deadline. It should be noted, however, that this is a citizens' group which has been able to get together at most once a week, which has no staff to speak of, and which has somewhat imprecisely defined terms of reference. Though its members are all estimable men, many of them are carry-overs from a precursor committee, established by President Eisenhower, which looked on without sounding any very noisy alarm at what was happening over the years in CIA. In a certain sense, these men are now being asked to investigate their own past performance. One trusts that the President will supplement their recommendations with some independent-minded staff work and with a much wider range of consultation in and out of government.

## Berlin: To Talk or Not to Talk

Mr. Khrushchev's memorandum to the President in effect asks for *de facto* recognition of the division of Germany and for a new statute guaranteeing a neutral and demilitarized West Berlin. Khrushchev wants to accomplish this by negotiation among the Great Powers; in the event this is rejected, by negotiation between the West German and East German Governments. If neither is possible, he is prepared to go it alone and turn over Soviet occupation rights in Berlin to the East German regime. Khrushchev states that he will not insist on the "immediate withdrawal" of either Germany from its military alliances; nor does he "link the conclusion of a peace treaty with the recognition of the German Democratic Republic" by the United States.

Secretary Rusk has said no. Dr. Adenauer and Willy

Brandt have said never. But the matter will not rest there. US policy for more than a decade has been based on the possibility of a Soviet "roll-back" in Europe. This in turn has rested on one of two assumptions: either the willingness of the Soviet Union to permit German reunification through free elections (that is to say, the end of a Communist regime in any part of Germany) or, a successful internal uprising in the East which would, in effect, have the same result. Both assumptions are now fantastic.

Why does the prospect of a Soviet surrender of occupation rights so frighten us? The answer, of course, is that we would then be expected to deal with the East German authorities (or, as we call them, "Soviet agents"). These "agents" might throw roadblocks across the lines of communication to Berlin. Thereafter, they might try to take over the city by force. All this is possible, but it is not a new prospect; it is no more fearful than what we have been living with since the end of World War II. The Russians could at any time have pinched off Berlin, had they wished to risk a war, or had they been able to persuade the people of West Berlin to abandon their partiality for the West. In the last analysis, all that we have ever been able to do to deter the Russians from absorbing Berlin was to threaten to go to war. That deterrence, for what it is worth, would be just as convincing to East German authorities as to Russian. As for access to Berlin, why would that be put in any greater jeopardy by having East Germans at the control points?

We may be determined that there shall be no change, but if the Russians wish to alter their own relations with East Germany, and thus Berlin, we cannot prevent it. The only practical question worth considering, therefore, is whether a change could be made that would leave the West no weaker in Berlin than it is now. And its present position now is weak - not only because of our reluctance to wage a conventional war in Europe, but because our claim that no power may unilaterally terminate its occupation rights in Berlin - after 15 years - flies in the face of common sense.

Mr. Khrushchev knows, at least he has been told often enough, that the US does not intend to deliver the West Berliners to Communism. That is not what is at issue. What is at issue, as Mr. Khrushchev put it in his memorandum, is what "other measures . . . could guarantee the freedom and independence of West Berlin as a free, demilitarized city." Or as Walter Lippmann reported after his talks with Khrushchev in April, "whether or not we say that the freedom of West Berlin, to which we are pledged, can be maintained only by refusal to negotiate about this future."

It will take courage for Mr. Kennedy to look at this problem coolly. It will take courage because, partly as a result of popular frustration over Cuba, Laos and the